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3T
he Katine community partnerships 
project (KCPP) is a major 
development initiative, located  
in Katine, a sub-county of 29,300 
people in north-eastern Uganda1.  
The KCPP is an integrated, 
community-based development 
project that aims to improve the 
lives of people living in Katine. It is sponsored by  
Guardian News & Media and Barclays, and receives 
support from Guardian readers. Over three years, 
£2.5m has been budgeted for the project. 
Responsibility for managing the project is with the 
African Medical and Research Foundation (Amref), an 
African non-governmental organisation (NGO)2. 
Specific elements of the project are supported by two 
other NGOs, Farm-Africa and Care International 
through its local partner, Uweso3. The KCPP is making 
major investments in the following related sectors:
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& Sanitation page 21 
Health page 23 
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Introduction
‘This is the village where the 
Guardian hopes to transform  
lives and prospects. In three  
years’ time Katine and its  
sub-county should have taken  
some sizeable steps… it may  
be a very different place’
Guardian launch supplement, October 2007
‘The record is mixed.  
Development is a difficult  
business, with frequent  
setbacks’
Madeleine Bunting
“Katine: Two Years On” 1 November 2009
The governance strand focuses on empowering 
people in the sub-county. This is to ensure that 
people have the capacity to keep the infrastructure  
in place and maintain the work of the KCPP once the 
project draws to a close in 2011.4
The KCPP is important for its use of journalism and 
web-based technologies. In place of the usual 
Christmas appeal, the Guardian decided to see if 
Katine offered a new way of reporting development, 
and a new way of using “21st-century technologies” 
to address problems of poverty and under-
development.5 Could a news organisation hold the 
attention of readers beyond Christmas? Throughout 
the project, the Guardian has run a website dedicated 
to Katine, which provides a forum for discussion and 
debate. The website has used traditional reporting 
alongside “new media”, such as blogs from “experts”, 
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comments from readers, videos and interviews, 
which provide an ongoing discussion about Katine, 
exploring what is being done there and what might be 
done better. It is a remarkable degree of exposure for 
one development project. The openness shown by all 
of the partners involved means that source material 
rarely put in the public domain — surveys, budgets 
and evaluations — is available on the site. 
The purpose of this review is to provide an 
overview of the KCPP, how it was conducted and 
what lessons have been learned. In each chapter, I 
look at a particular aspect of the KCPP, building a 
story of the project, how it has been reported, 
commented on and used, and how it has evolved over 
the past three years. In a move away from the usual 
evaluations — with their multiplicity of acronyms and 
accumulated detail — the concern is to offer an overall 
narrative which appeals to a wider audience of policy 
makers, academics, journalists, NGO workers and 
others interested in international development. 
A central focus is the relationship between the 
Guardian and the different NGOs involved in the 
project. As the opening quotations suggest, what 
started out as a relatively simple idea of helping 
people in a rural community in Africa became 
increasingly complicated as time went on. What 
follows is my assessment of the project, how it 
worked and how it changed over time. I look at key 
moments, such as the building of the school at 
Amorikot and the football tournament. In piecing 
together an analysis of the KCPP, I draw on insights 
from academics looking at similar situations 
elsewhere. I also draw heavily on my own knowledge 
of eastern Uganda, its history, patterns of social 
organisation and politics. (I have conducted detailed 
ethnographic work in a community 30 miles to the 
south of Katine.) Included within the analysis are 
shorter pieces on what has been achieved in the five 
different project strands (see pages 19–28).
F
irst, some background on the project. 
The KCPP was started by the 
Guardian and Barclays in October 
2007. The idea for Katine came from 
the Guardian’s editor, Alan 
Rusbridger. He wanted to use “all the 
possibilities of the web [to] give 
maximum exposure to the challenges 
of development”.6 The project also made sure that 
the Guardian, as a news organisation, continued its 
commitment to innovate in terms of reporting 
international development issues. When the project 
was first proposed, web-based technologies were far 
less developed than they are now. In April 2007, 
Facebook had 20 million subscribers (compared to 
500 million today).7 Newspaper websites could not 
carry much video material. Technologies which now 
seem relatively commonplace — Twitter, Flickr, 
Posterous — had not yet been invented, or were not 
yet widely used. A concept such as “crowd-sourcing” 
(using the internet to get people from wherever they 
are to pool information on a given subject) had yet to 
be tested in the context of a development project. 
The web 2.0 platform that Katine uses was, in 2007, at 
the cutting edge in terms of interactive information 
sharing.8 
This was an innovative approach to development. 
It moved coverage away from one-off stories, or the 
sort of reporting that traditionally profiles major 
crises in the developing world. Two Ugandan 
journalists, Joseph Malinga and Richard M Kavuma, 
worked as reporters to provide a different view on the 
KCPP and development generally. Katine looked at 
the complex processes of development and change in 
a community over a three-year period. The close 
partnership between the Guardian and the NGOs on 
which the Katine project was built has been widely 
recognised for its achievements in bringing 
development to a wider audience in a new way. The 
website was awarded the 2008 International Visual 
Communications Association “Clarion” award, and 
the 2008 One World Media new media award for its 
ongoing coverage of development. Guardian News & 
Media (which owns the Guardian), Barclays and 
Amref also won the 2010 Coffey International Award 
for Excellence, granted by Business in the 
Community, which recognises organisations that 
have had a positive impact in pursuing the UN’s 
millennium development goals. 
Katine was launched through the Guardian 
Christmas appeal back in 2007. Interested readers 
could give a one-off donation or commit to giving a 
monthly sum. They could then track the progress of 
the project over the three years on the website and in 
the newspaper.9 Before this, the Guardian had 
established a partnership with Barclays. Barclays was 
interested in supporting an holistic development 
programme that offered significant learning and also 
the opportunity to test new approaches to financial 
services. Barclays made an initial donation of 
£500,000, partly to help with start-up funding, 
including the costs of setting up the website, and 
then a further £1m in match-funding reader 
donations over the three years of the project.10 
Barclays also funded the village savings and loans 
associations. The choice of Katine made sense for 
Barclays’ corporate profile in Africa. Barclays has 53 
branches dotted throughout Uganda and more than 
120,000 Ugandan customers.11
Why Katine? A number of NGOs responded to the 
Guardian’s call for expressions of interest. In the end, 
there was a shortlist of three. The two that did not 
succeed were proposals by major, UK-based, 
international NGOs. Amref’s winning proposal for an 
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integrated community development project in Katine 
was chosen for two principal reasons. First, Amref is 
based in Africa, with headquarters in Nairobi. This 
gives a different profile from the more famous or 
visible international NGOs, such as Oxfam. Second, 
there was a sense that Katine would be a place 
readers could identify with. Katine was poor, 
demonstrating many of the fundamental issues 
associated with poverty in rural Africa. Being rural 
meant it was also a bounded space. People using the 
website or reading the paper would have a defined 
sense of the geography within which their project 
was operating.12 
Amref’s office in London set up a dedicated staff 
team to work on Katine, to manage the relationship 
with the project donors — the Guardian and Barclays 
— and to provide separate administrative support to 
manage the donations.13 The Uganda country office in 
Kampala and field office in Katine were responsible 
for the implementation of the KCPP on the ground. 
Amref UK managed the grant and reported to the 
funders, along with Amref Uganda, on how the 
project was doing. This reporting was done most 
obviously in the form of the six-month and annual 
project reports. There were also two types of project 
evaluation, one commissioned by Amref, the other 
commissioned by the Guardian.14 Evaluators gave 
ongoing feedback to the project as it progressed. 
Much of the documentation for the project was made 
available on the website, including all the reviews 
and evaluations. These reports provide much of the 
material for this review.
In terms of the overall governance structure of the 
project — the way it was run from the top — the 
original idea was to have a steering committee made 
up of Alan Rusbridger, editor of the Guardian, Dr 
Michael Smalley, director general of Amref, and 
Rachael Barber, the then head of global community 
investment for Barclays. As the project progressed, 
the management structure shifted down towards a 
system of monthly conference calls involving those 
closer to the project. This group included Joshua 
Kyallo and Susan Wandera (Amref Uganda), Grace 
Mukasa and Claudia Codsi (Amref UK), Madeleine 
Bunting, Liz Ford and Jo Confino (the Guardian) and 
Barclays’ relationship manager, initially Susie Hares 
and then Rachael Barber. These monthly calls were an 
opportunity for partners to explain what they were 
doing, and to relate the work of the project to what 
was being discussed on the Guardian’s Katine 
?????????
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K
atine is a poor part of a poor 
country. Uganda’s gross 
national income per person in 
2007 was $1,059 (£676), making 
it 163rd out of 181 countries 
listed in the UN Human 
Development Report.15 Soroti 
district, where Katine is 
located, has a poverty prevalence of 77% (meaning 
77% of the people there are categorised as poor by the 
government of Uganda), far worse than the national 
average of 31%.16
The majority of households in Katine make a living 
through cultivating foodstuffs — cassava, groundnuts, 
millet, sorghum and sweet potatoes.17 Much of this is 
used to feed the family, and life is categorised around 
a fairly modest set of activities, which generate some 
sort of income for people. Day labouring for a 
neighbour, farming one’s land or, in the case of 
women, brewing and selling beer, offer the most 
regular sources of income for the majority.18 What you 
find in most villages are churches, a primary school, a 
local court and organisations based on the extended 
family. There are also NGOs and community-based 
organisations working in many rural areas. 
This present-day poverty contrasts sharply  
with Katine’s history. In the first half of the 20th 
century, the Teso region, where Katine is located,  
was noted for its cotton production.19 For most of  
the colonial and post-colonial period, Teso was 
relatively prosperous. Cotton production required  
the imposition of a number of hierarchical structures 
— chiefs, schools, mission churches, local government 
offices — which have also persisted through the 
various post-colonial regimes. Profits from cotton 
were invested into acquiring large stocks of cattle, 
which retained their cultural value. As late as the 
early 1980s, it was not unusual to find a “big man”  
in Katine with 200 or 300 head of cattle.20 To a certain 
extent, Katine falls outside the standard narrative  
of Uganda.21 The 1970s, the years of Idi Amin — 
typically seen as the nadir of Uganda’s post-colonial 
disaster — were relatively peaceful. This is not  
really true for Katine. For Katine, things got much, 
much worse in 1986.
The current government came to power in 1986.  
At the time, there was a power vacuum in the east of 
the country. The new government had its support 
base in western and central Uganda and saw Katine as 
Context
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In the spotlight 
‘Our vision is an Africa where  
good-quality, affordable health  
care is accessible to everyone’ 
(Amref)
http://amrefuk.org/who-we-are/
‘Our mission is to create lasting 
change in poor communities  
and we put money where it is  
needed most’  
(Care International)
http://www.careinternational.org.uk/who-we-are
‘Oxfam is a global movement of 
people working with others to 
overcome poverty and suffering’ 
(Oxfam)
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/
an opposition area. Raiders from the north-east were 
allowed into Katine, and they looted cattle. Over a 
three-year period, up to half a million head of cattle 
were taken from Teso, destroying the region’s 
wealth.22 By the end of 1986, Teso was in open 
rebellion against the new government. Initially, 
rebels targeted soldiers, police officers and politicians 
from the new regime. But as the rebellion dragged on, 
much of the violence turned inwards. This had a 
profound effect. The rebellion became localised and 
politicised, with rebels attacking local leaders and 
clan elders, often on the back of already existing 
conflicts. In 2003, incursions by a rebel movement 
called the Lord’s Resistance Army further 
?????????????????????????????????????
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The new school opens.26 Alam Construc-
tion refurbished seven classrooms in 
Amorikot. These classrooms were 
budgeted at 18.7m Ugandan shillings. 
The KCPP also provided Amorikot primary 
school with 126 desks and a number of 
new textbooks.27
The same month there are reports that 
Alam is delaying its work.28
The budget for Amorikot is questioned  
by journalists and bloggers. Richard M 
Kavuma, a journalist, notes that the 
government spends only 14m Ugandan 
shillings per classroom. Ugandalife,  
who regularly comments on Katine blogs 
and who runs a project in Masaka district, 
says that he built classrooms for only  
9.5m Ugandan shillings.29 
KCPP staff defend their approach  
by stating that their work was of better 
quality than government-contracted 
school buildings, and was done more 
quickly.30
 
Guardian journalist Madeleine Bunting 
reviews the project and questions the 
education budget.31
Amref takes legal advice over delays in 
school building work after Alam 
Construction default on their work.32
Community journalist Joseph Malinga 
reports that the number of desks 
accounted for by KCPP staff contradicts  
the actual number found in the schools. 
Amref points out that the report was 
inaccurate.33
Joseph Malinga reports the unhappiness 
of locals, school teachers included, with 
the work of Amref. After trying to end its 
contract with Alam Construction, Amref 
is obliged to let them resume work on 
another primary school in Katine.34
Parent and teacher concerns are raised, 
particularly over the question of whether 
Amorikot will become a registered 
government school.35  
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P
ublic perceptions of NGOs are 
very positive. They can claim  
to work with people on the 
margins of the global system. 
Their work is value-driven, and 
NGOs raise funds on the basis 
that they bring about meaningful 
change (Howell and Pearce, 
2001). Visits to the websites of different NGOs 
(including those involved in the KCPP) reveal the 
mission statements (previous page).
For most people interested in development, 
knowledge of NGOs comes from a newsletter or  
from a fundraising campaign. This means that  
NGOs have been relatively free to define how they  
are perceived, with the result that something of  
the complexity and compromise involved in doing 
development work gets edited out. Those who 
actually have to implement a project are aware  
that claims made in newsletters or fundraising 
campaigns are optimistic and have to be a 
simplification of what is a complicated reality.  
The wider public is less aware of these constraints.  
There is often a fairly sizeable gap, therefore,  
between the way NGOs present themselves at home 
and the complex and messy business of 
implementing a project abroad. The KCPP began  
with the dictum “it starts with a village”. The 
complexity of starting with a village only became 
clear as the project went on.
The Guardian’s spotlight on the KCPP has both 
highlighted this gap and helped to bridge it.  
This has not always been a comfortable experience.  
The Guardian’s involvement meant a remarkable 
degree of public scrutiny for one particular 
development project, and the KCPP has been  
a particularly defining experience for Amref.  
Its work has been scrutinised by journalists, 
academics, practitioners and bloggers.23
Commentary on the website became critical  
of the KCPP fairly early on. Take, perhaps,  
the most complicated story told on the website –  
that of the building of Amorikot primary school.  
Over the past three years, Guardian journalists  
and public commentators documented the mixed  
and uneven experience of Amorikot. Amref  
adopted an approach that differed from the  
usual “community-supported” model used by  
other NGOs in the Teso region. It brought in  
a contractor from Kampala, the capital city, in the 
hope of getting the school built quickly. This was  
later presented as a way of winning over people  
in the area and of showing early results to those 
funding the project.24 A basic chronology of what 
appeared on the website, in terms of critical articles 
and blogged comments on Amorikot and education, 
is as follows (right).25
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Amorikot a quick win.41
The Guardian also invited experts such as Jeffrey 
Sachs and Paul Collier to post on the Katine website.42 
These contributions typically took the form of a 
transcribed interview with a journalist, or an editorial 
on a particular development topic. They offered a 
way of debating some of the big issues in global 
development. Experts presented their view on such 
development topics as why Africa is poor, whether 
aid is a good thing, or the nature of the relationship 
between religion and HIV/Aids. This brought 
important issues in development to a wider audience.
At the same time, the views of these experts were 
sometimes at variance with what was being done on 
the ground, demonstrating the plurality of views on 
development and how best to do it. On 25 February 
2008, for example, an interview with Bob Reed of 
Loughborough University’s Water, Education and 
Development Centre, was posted. Reed made a 
general statement about what works in terms of 
water interventions in Africa. He argued that for 
boreholes and piped water systems to succeed, there 
needed to be continued financial and managerial 
support from outsiders. This contradicted the 
approach adopted in Katine (where the boreholes 
were funded by an NGO, and where communities 
were trained to manage and maintain the borehole 
once the project ends).43
Like the ongoing reporting on Amorikot, the 
interview with Reed is an example of journalism 
opening up some of the assumptions behind a 
particular development project. At the same time, 
this sort of “comment” had to hang in the air; it could 
not be easily incorporated into the project design on 
the ground (something discussed later). There was a 
tension between what could be debated on the 
???????????? ???? ????????????????
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The last piece, written by Anne Perkins in November 
2009, suggested that the confident-looking outside 
appearance of the new school at Amorikot threatened 
to become a “shell”, with declining local support, no 
money from the district education office, unused 
textbooks and a high turnover of teachers.36 While 
there were a number of more positive pieces, 
particularly early on — “training to make a 
difference”, “primary schools get health kits” — the 
dominant narrative is of the unevenness of the 
work.37
This is not an unusual story. Getting schools built 
in Uganda is a difficult business, and there are many 
far more troubling stories than that of Amorikot 
primary school. Many of the government-built school 
facilities, for example, collapsed or were not fit for 
use because contractors substituted cheaper sand for 
cement.38 What was unusual about the construction 
of Amorikot primary school was not that things went 
wrong, but that it happened so publicly. The story 
was available to anyone who wanted to go to the 
Katine website. While this story is something 
Ugandans observe on a regular basis, it is less familiar 
to the sort of people who receive a campaign 
newsletter, or contribute to a fundraising appeal, 
back in the UK.
The criticism and scrutiny that surrounded 
different parts of the project proved extremely 
difficult for KCPP staff. A review of the project 
conducted at the halfway stage noted that project 
staff had little idea of what blogging might mean in 
terms of opening up their work to criticism, which 
was often hostile in tone (Slavin, 2009). Take, for 
example, the following comment from Ugandalife 
about the use of outside contractors in school 
building work:
It was insulting [of Amref] to suggest that local 
builders could not build a quality school … 
Involved with the design? Not likely. Was the 
community informed that 173 Ugandan shillings 
(£52,424) were being spent on a school? Not 
likely. There were no specifics about what the 
community involvement was … Of course, the 
people would be happy with what they got. An 
oversized tent could have been erected and they 
would have been happy.39
This kind of commentary was difficult for Amref staff 
to deal with. Hazel Slavin, author of the mid-term 
review, said that staff “go to work anticipating what 
they might see on the website”, making them feel 
“upset, sometimes confused and angry”.40 And yet, 
Ugandalife raised real issues. The way the decisions 
were made deserved scrutiny, while Amref’s claims 
about community involvement, which takes time, 
contradicted its earlier statement about making 
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done in a project the news organisation had chosen to 
fund. Many journalists interviewed for this review 
expressed a desire to draw a clear distinction between 
the Guardian’s role as funder and its work in reporting 
on the project. But this was not always how things 
were perceived by others. There was a blurring of 
boundaries. The KCPP had, in some ways, to respond 
to what appeared on the website. By the time of  
Amref’s March 2009 report, for example, the school 
building component of the KCPP had moved to “the 
community approach that Amref had used in other 
projects”, where construction costs were minimised 
through the “community contribution of local 
building resources” such as bricks and sand for the 
cement.47 This was, in part, a response to pressures 
from the website.
The power that comes with funding a project is 
something that all development agencies deal with.48 
In the more usual case, the funding agency — the 
World Bank or the UK’s Department for International 
Development, for example — is highly familiar with 
the way things are done. The World Bank staffer is 
practised in the ways of being a donor and can set to 
one side some of the discomfort that comes from 
being very powerful in a place where people are 
relatively powerless. For journalists, the situation has 
been much less familiar. The desire to draw a clear 
distinction between the project as something 
managed by the NGO, and the reporting as something 
done by journalists — a point made repeatedly in 
interview — was also a way of acknowledging that 
this separation was never really complete.49 Things 
were never as settled or fixed as had been imagined at 
the start. 
The reporting of health issues shows some of the 
complexities of debating development while also 
sponsoring a development project. In its original 
design, the KCPP health programme focused the 
majority of its efforts on community-based 
approaches and preventative measures.50 Children 
were immunised, insecticide-treated bednets 
provided, clean water access increased. Early articles 
looked at Amref’s efforts in these areas of community 
health work. As time went on, discussions on health 
looked more and more at the question of access to 
drugs and the lack of expert medical treatment at the  
health centres in Tiriri and Ojom:51
Tiriri offered a window on global health concerns 
such as the provision of cheaper generic drugs. In the 
above, you also notice that the constituency which 
built up around Tiriri health centre included DfID and 
GlaxoSmithKline. At the same time, the KCPP had its 
focus on community-based approaches and 
preventative measures such as the distribution of 
bednets.58 There was a degree of disjuncture between 
what was debated on the website and what was 
happening on the ground.59
B
y the halfway stage, there had 
been a total of 17 separate visits 
to Katine by Guardian 
journalists. More often than not, 
the same journalist visited on 
more than one occasion, 
producing a more complex and 
critical picture of development 
than normally found in the reporting of development 
issues in the UK media. The story of Amorikot 
primary school showed readers what development 
looks like. As Charlie Beckett, of the London School  
of Economics, notes: 
The fact is that we want NGOs to work against 
injustice and poverty. We expect them to  
speak out passionately in favour of policies  
that advance their goals and support their work.  
That is quite different from our traditional 
assumptions about journalism. We want 
journalists who are independent, critical and 
skilled at investigation and honest storytelling.44 
The sort of journalism that speaks directly to the 
reader is that which provokes a debate or reveals 
something otherwise hidden.45 The pieces criticising 
Amref’s work or pointing to problems on the  
ground generated more debate, more “traffic” from 
bloggers. The article on school desks by Joseph 
Malinga generated more reaction than did “opening 
new doors at Katine primary school”: 63 blogged 
comments compared to zero.46 
The Guardian’s simultaneous role as sponsor of the 
project and also as host of the online space where the 
project was debated pulled in different directions. 
The information that appeared on the website — 
whether in the form of comments from bloggers, 
articles by journalists, or opinion pieces by experts — 
was more than just a way of opening up development 
to a new audience. It also challenged what was being 
The Guardian 
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There was also a concern that the original structure  
of the project allocated too few resources to the 
livelihoods component. The project evaluator, Rick 
Davies, mentions this as a concern in his review at 
the end of the first year of the project. Farm-Africa 
also argued for more funds for livelihoods, as did the 
Guardian and Barclays. In the initial conception of the 
project, it was the least prioritised of the four areas 
that required major physical investments. There was 
much less money when compared to water and 
sanitation, education and health. As the project 
progressed there was a fairly dramatic increase, as the 
increasing slice of pink in the graph (right) shows:
Over the three years, the money allocated to 
agriculture (livelihoods) increased from £144,762  
to £195,467, and as a share of the budget from 17%  
to 29%.
This increase in budget allocation was also 
matched by the scaling up of the agricultural 
component (livelihoods) to reach more people. The 
project shifted from working with 18 farmers’ groups 
in a fairly intensive and innovative way, towards a 
more surface-level interaction with 66 groups (one 
for each village in the sub-county). This was in 
response to demands from people in Katine, who 
argued  that the livelihoods component should 
benefit more people directly. The scaling up was also 
something supported by evaluators, journalists and 
commentators on the website. At the same time, 
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Tiriri health centre gets piped water.52
Tiriri health centre gets its first 
laboratory.53
DfID officials talk drugs in Katine, 
including a discussion of the need  
for public-private partnerships.54 
Ivan Lewis, a DfID minister,  
officially opens the laboratory in Ojom.55 
“Katine’s influence spreads to business 
sector”.56 GlaxoSmithKline urged to pool 
medicine rights to make drugs cheaper. 
New staff for Katine health centres.57
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Timeline of Tiriri health centre
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rapid scaling up caused concern among staff working 
on livelihoods both in Katine and in Farm-Africa’s  
UK office. This may explain the mixed results 
(Livelihoods, page 25).
What appeared on the website was not a neutral 
thing, nor was it entirely extrinsic to the life of the 
project on the ground. Bloggers, journalists and 
development experts helped shape what was valued 
in terms of what was being done on the ground.  
This was a more open way of doing development 
work. It made the project more complicated, and 
meant that there was a much wider and more diverse 
constituency addressing the question of how to  
do development in Katine. One way in which Amref 
responded to this was to stick to the way the project 
?????????????????????????
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W
hat emerges, when 
going through the 
KCPP reports and 
reviews, is a sense of  
a well-designed 
blueprint. The six-
monthly reviews 
measure the progress 
of the project against the original project design. 
Surprisingly, given what has been discussed so far, 
there is almost no reference to the Guardian in the 
KCPP’s own reporting, or the influence that the 
website had on the project.60 Though journalists, 
“experts” and bloggers made the project a very 
particular experience for field staff — as evaluators 
noted — this is something rarely discussed in the 
project documentation provided by Amref. If a 
regular reader of the website went to the KCPP 
reports to find out about the project’s complexities,  
it would not really be revealed. Instead, changes to 
the school building programme, the agriculture 
(livelihoods) budget, or the health centre at Tiriri are 
described with little reference to the role of the 
newspaper or the website. The picture which emerges 
in the project documents is very much one of an 
organisation implementing its work. Why is there this 
disjuncture? 
In answering this question, it is important to think 
of the number of relationships KCPP had to manage 
and maintain. Projects involve myriad relationships. 
In terms of the KCPP, there were relationships 
between different NGOs, beneficiaries, funders,  
local, district and national governments, academics, 
Barclays, the Guardian, journalists, bloggers and a 
global audience. There are also relationships within 
organisations. Some journalists were closer to others; 
some of the KCPP staff in Katine had a closer 
relationship with the country team in Kampala or the 
London office. There were also relationships between 
different organisations. A journalist might have a 
good relationship with one project officer on the 
KCPP, or an Amref project officer might get on well 
with a counterpart in Farm-Africa. Maintaining an 
Amref and the 
Guardian 
Blueprints
12
Football Association were involved, as was another 
NGO, Cosseda, which had been working in the region 
to set up a Teso-wide football league. No one really 
owned the football tournament, even though for 
many people in Katine it was a very tangible and 
popular moment.68
Reflecting on the tournament a year on, for 
example, Charles Eromu, chairman of the Katine sub-
county football association, observed in an interview 
with Richard M Kavuma: “The football tournament 
was a good idea because it helped us identify talented 
youngsters … it helped the young people themselves 
to discover what they can do.” But Eromu also added 
that “things had gone back to what they were before 
the tournament”.69 New football pitches that had 
been promised for the different schools had not been 
delivered, while the goalposts and signposts had 
spent half a year in the storeroom of the KCPP office, 
before being transferred to the schools. While the 
project could be stretched to reflect new thinking on 
existing strands, it was difficult to adapt to something 
entirely new.
NGOs are often admired for their adaptability, 
flexibility and capacity for innovation.70 Yet NGOs are 
also anxious to implement what they have committed 
themselves to do. They are wary about being pulled 
in too many directions. A blueprint is a coherent 
framework that provides a practical guide to what to 
do. It articulates goals, methods and expected 
outcomes and is a way of achieving a degree of 
predictability. In the case of the KCPP, the blueprint 
also served as a way of resisting demands placed on 
the project by others.71 While people at the Guardian, 
or those participating on the website, wanted to feel 
that the project was a dynamic, responsive and 
evolving thing, this was not necessarily what was 
wanted by project staff. In some ways, NGOs are in a 
bind. If they don’t implement the blueprint — which 
is, after all, a contractual agreement — they are failing 
to deliver. But if they stick too closely to the 
blueprint, they are open to the criticism that they are 
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idea of the logic or coherence of the project while also 
making sense of the complexity of these different 
relationships is difficult. In the case of the KCPP, the 
complexity was of a different order, because of the 
involvement of the Guardian, which was running a 
website on the project.
Professor David Mosse, of the School of Oriental 
and African Studies, argues that project documents 
offer a space for coherence in a world that is 
otherwise diffuse.61 Documents are a way of holding 
together what are often contradictory interests. 
Development projects involve many participants, and 
any sense of unity is easily destabilised: “The greater 
the number of people invited to the party, the more 
energy is expended attending to their needs, and the 
more their needs shape a project”.62 They are also 
holding off demands. Not only does the neatness and 
logic of the original blueprint give some assurance of 
coherence, it offers a space which gives value to the 
authority and expertise of the NGO. This explains 
why those parts of the project that were in the 
original blueprint are also those discussed in greatest 
detail in the KCPP reports.
The one thing that truly existed outside the 
blueprint was the football tournament held in 2009. 
(This is something barely commented on in KCPP 
documents.) The tournament was initiated by 
journalists from the Guardian and was seen as a way 
of involving youth in the sub-county. The football 
tournament provided the sort of event that might 
engage new readers (football fans) in using the Katine 
website, and had the active support of the editor of 
the sports desk.63 It was very much the initiative of 
the Guardian and was supported by the country office 
of Amref Uganda. The football tournament was based 
on the understanding that NGOs should be able to 
adapt their work as they go along. As the planning 
progressed, however, it became clear that there was 
much less interest in the tournament from KCPP staff 
on the ground.64 
In Mosse’s language, the football tournament 
“destabilised” the project too much, and at this point 
the blueprint became something very real. 
The tournament was never fully integrated into 
the work of the KCPP. It was not the sort of thing 
KCPP staff were used to doing, and it involved lots of 
people from Katine, many of whom expected a lot 
from the KCPP, but who had been marginal to other 
aspects of the project. The football tournament was 
hugely popular with young men and women in 
Katine.65 It required a lot of time, spontaneity and 
adaptability. At the same time, it added yet more 
relationships, organisations and individuals to the 
project.66 Aside from the large numbers of youths 
involved, the Uganda national football team came to 
Katine; there was also a visit from the Barclays 
Premier League trophy.67 Officials from the Ugandan 
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Katine 
Influencing 
the project?
I
n all of this back-and-forth between NGOs 
and the Guardian, what influence did people 
in Katine have? Development is often 
framed around ideas of engaging with the 
powerless, allowing the “voices” of the poor 
to be heard. NGOs, in particular, present 
themselves as giving a voice to the voiceless. 
The KCPP included the idea that blogs, 
citizen journalism, live link-ups between schools in 
Katine and the UK, and the use of new media would 
offer people in the community ways of campaigning 
and commenting on what they saw taking place 
around them. In Katine, a media resource centre was 
established to allow people to achieve these things.72 
The resource centre was a room with computers and 
access to the internet, and was one half of the 
building that housed KCPP staff in Katine. In the 
centre people could read about the project and use 
the internet to communicate concerns and stories. 
The experience of KCPP suggests a number of 
things. First, that the digital divide is, in many ways, 
difficult to bridge. There are problems of literacy and 
a lack of formal education.73 Many of those living in 
Katine struggled to translate or formulate their 
stories in ways that fitted in to how outsiders wanted 
to understand them. Those with more education, or 
more past experience of development work, proved 
better at putting their stories across. The way Katine 
is discussed on the website, or in this review, would 
seem odd to many, and trying to fit a comment or 
write a response to a piece by a journalist was not 
always straightforward. To give an example, it is fairly 
usual in Katine to talk about life through a religious or 
strongly moral idiom — Pentecostal Christianity is a 
big influence in the region. This is a form of 
expression that may be at odds with the secular, 
liberal narrative of development.74
At the same time, accessing new media depended 
on using the community resource centre, which 
meant sitting in the same building as KCPP staff or 
talking to Joseph Malinga, a journalist employed 
through Panos, a global network of journalists and 
reporters. Malinga helped run the community centre 
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(the only place in Katine with access to the internet). 
This meant that the potential of the internet as a 
democratic or critical space could not really be 
realised.75 The use of web-based technologies placed 
KCPP staff in a contradictory position. While, on 
paper, there must be a commitment to listening to 
communities, to hearing their voices, in practice 
certain voices are easier to listen to than others. 
Instead, what seemed to worked well in Katine 
was the more traditional approach of talking to 
journalists to get their story out. Many of the reports 
on the website relied on observations or information 
from locals. The building of Amorikot primary school 
is more than a story of journalists observing a 
problem at a distance from the community. It is also a 
story of people in Katine helping make the story.76 
Journalists were approached by locals and provided 
with leads. The article by Joseph Malinga that 
reported a discrepancy between the number of desks 
delivered to a school and the number accounted for 
on the project books depended on a schoolteacher 
raising the issue in the first place.77
The American scholars Margaret E Keck (Johns 
Hopkins University) and Kathryn Sikkink (University 
of Maryland) write about this.78 They show how 
people use a distant third party to apply pressure on 
those with power nearer to them. In their particular 
study, Keck and Sikkink look at advocacy networks 
and focus on community organisations which use 
international NGOs to change national government 
policy. They term this a “boomerang effect”. The 
issue is thrown out by the relatively powerless and 
returned back with greater force by the powerful 
outsider. In Katine, a slightly different boomerang 
was to hand. Journalists became the powerful 
outsider and people on the ground were the ones 
who threw out the issue to put pressure back on the 
NGO. In this, the people of Katine appeared to 
understand the Guardian’s role as reporter/funder 
more clearly than others. 
But boomerangs do not always bounce back. For 
the powerless to bring about change, they must get 
the powerful interested and engaged. People in 
Katine most consistently petitioned for cattle, but 
they were never part of the project. While the 
Guardian journalist, David Smith, noted that “it 
seems it will take a long time to persuade Katine 
farmers that cattle is anything but the answer to their 
prayers” (8 December 2008), Farm-Africa, the NGO 
responsible for the original design of the livelihoods 
component (subsequently managed by Amref with 
technical support from Farm-Africa), did not allow 
space for cattle to enter into the project.79 TheNGO’s 
initial assessment committed the project to 
promoting food security and cash crops, village 
savings and loans associations, and “rural innovation 
groups”. Venansio Tumuhaise, project officer for 
14
‘Development agencies tend to focus 
more strongly on the promised 
delivery of change in the future than 
they do on analysing the historical 
contexts and origins of development 
ideas and practices’
Lewis, 2009: 32
Katine 
Development 
past and 
present
D
avid Lewis, of the London 
School of Economics had just 
returned from visiting the 
Swedish government’s 
international development 
agency. Sida had recently moved 
offices. Amid the chaos of the 
move, staff were told to jettison 
documents that were more than two years old. Lewis 
reflects on this, and puzzles over the way 
development is drawn towards the future to the 
exclusion of the past. Though recent history is 
probably the best way of predicting the immediate 
future, it is rarely allowed to influence the way 
development gets done. Development has “a strong 
— and in many ways understandable — sense of 
wanting to look forward rather than back”.85 
One of the things the Guardian wanted to do with 
Katine was to get beyond this. Early on in the project 
there were a number of articles on the website that 
linked Katine to broader histories of development, for 
example, pieces looking at the evolution of Uganda’s 
relationship with international donors.86 In a more 
particular way, repeated reference has been made to 
the incursions of the Lord’s Resistance Army in 
Katine from 2003 to 2006 (though, it should be noted, 
this has been a less defining experience for people 
than the insurgency of the late 1980s and early 
1990s).87 More generally, the website allowed space 
for a discussion of the past and how it informed the 
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livelihoods, suggested that people placed too much 
emphasis on cows: “There are other farming 
communities in Uganda where people just rely on a 
hand hoe” (30 November 2008). This denies the 
skills-base of the region (ploughing is a technique 
that people in Teso have – a technological advantage 
over other societies in Uganda).80 
As the anthropologist Ivan Karp suggests, cattle 
are “an important nexus of value for the Iteso”.81 
They not only plough the fields, they also mean a lot. 
To implement a project the size of the KCPP in Katine 
without doing much involving cattle was unusual. 
Cattle provide milk. They form part of the gifts given 
to a woman’s family on marriage, and the giving of 
cattle from father to son is a way of showing that the 
son is becoming a man. They also represent a way of 
maintaining social order and peaceable relations 
between generations. The loss of cattle during the 
insurgency years (1986-1993) is a big part of the 
reason people are poor and there are high levels of 
latent conflict.82
A series of articles looked at the cattle question. 
But this did not bring about changes in the project 
design. The expertise of the NGO took precedence 
over what would have been popular on the ground. 
The problem of “the cultural tradition of individual 
ownership” was pointed to, as was the need to bring 
people into line with the government’s agricultural 
priorities.83 The livelihoods component of the KCPP, 
like the work of many other NGOs in the Teso region, 
focused on cash crops, such as oranges and lemons, 
where the results have been mixed.84 A major 
investment later on in the project was in the 
community produce store, though such collective 
enterprises have a high failure rate in the Teso region. 
At the same time, I wanted cattle to be part of the 
project. But I was also aware that cattle were not seen 
as suitable, based on budget availability and the 
timescale of the project. At times, models of 
development are not always easy to relate to the 
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present. This was what I chose to write about. At the 
start of the KCPP, I was brought in to write blogs on 
the history of Katine, to give some political and social 
context. But if you look at where the weight of 
reporting falls, the focus is on the present and future. 
History matters not just because it is “context”,88 
but also because it influences how people act in the 
present. Past experiences inform the way people 
respond to a new development project (this may also 
be why the past is seen as an inconvenience that 
compromises the promise of “change”). 
Village health teams, introduced by the KCPP, are 
an example of this. Village health teams are meant to 
keep working once the funded part of the project 
comes to an end.89 They are part of a national 
strategy, which the government is formally 
committed to supporting.90 But villagers have seen 
village health teams in Katine before. Their earlier 
incarnation had fallen into disuse because of a lack of 
external support.91 According to the Ugandan 
journalist, Richard M Kavuma, the position of KCPP 
staff is that these earlier versions lacked 
“mobilisation, motivation and facilitation”.92 This is a 
less important point than the fact that this earlier 
failure shapes people’s expectations (something 
discussed in the next section). 
At the same time, it is important to understand 
that the KCPP is not only contextualised against past 
development interventions but also made sense of 
against Katine’s broader history. The KCPP was only 
part of what was going on in Katine, not the whole 
story. During the Teso insurgency from 1986 to 1993, 
Katine was one of the most troubled areas. The major 
road that runs through the sub-county was subject to 
ambush and robbery and was rarely travelled. People 
even took to cutting down the electricity poles as a 
way of cutting the area off. As many journalists have 
observed, conflict is not something external to 
Katine, not something “brought in” by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army. The KCPP was operating in a 
fragmented and politicised landscape of often sharp 
divisions. 
This history of violence also has implications for 
the long-term success of the KCPP. For many of the 
things that require a lot of “community 
participation”, such as the village health teams, the 
prospects are uncertain. Similarly, the resistance to 
giving people cattle because this encourages 
individualism may be problematic. Individualism is 
not only part of some deep cultural logic, it is also a 
measured response to the recent past. One exception 
may be the Barclays-sponsored village savings and 
loans associations.93 This is because they do not place 
too much of a burden on co-operation. The 
associations require a membership fee of only 200 
Ugandan shillings (8p) and members save regular 
sums; this then provides a common pool from which 
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they can borrow, but the borrowing can be for 
individual needs.94 Barclays supported village savings 
and loans associations in Katine as a way of testing 
out possible approaches to meeting the need for 
financial services among poorer people, and felt that 
it was working well enough to roll out a much larger 
version of the same scheme to work with half a 
million people in poorer parts of the world.95 In 
Katine, an Amref report states that in one year the 66 
associations already in existence had accumulated a 
total of 72,504,550 Ugandan shillings (£22,482).96
In some ways, village savings and loans 
associations do seem to build some sort of 
co-operation and trust in a place still coming to terms 
with the memory of the insurgency. But in many 
ways, their success comes from the fact that the 
social agenda of village savings and loans associations 
is fairly modest. They allow people to choose what to 
do with the money. They are not particularly 
prescriptive and, unlike many other development 
efforts, do not require people to engage in collective 
enterprises. People could borrow money from village 
savings and loans associations to buy cattle.97 Loans 
emphasised the individual, rather than the 
co-operative. Loans for fishing, brewing, running 
restaurants, setting up businesses and purchasing 
equipment have helped households diversify their 
sources of income in ways that did not require group 
work.98 Part of the usefulness of village savings and 
loans associations is that, unlike comparable 
programmes, they leave it up to the individual to 
decide what to do with the money. People had a say 
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The KCPP 
Sustainability  
and
empowerment
The table below lists the amount of money  
available for development-related activities in  
Katine. It lists the money available from the district 
government, the sub-county government and the 
KCPP (it excludes staff salaries).
Budget allocation for activities in Katine sub-county  
in 2008 and 2009 (GBP)99
Sources: Amref budget 2009; Soroti district  
development plan 09/10 p.41; Katine sub-county 
development plan 09/10 p.15 and p.17
The KCPP is designed around the idea that 
sustainability is to be achieved through working with 
local and district governments. As the above 
suggests, the relative budgets of district, sub-county 
and the KCPP are somewhat at odds with this aim. 
While KCPP documents argue that the district 
government will “incorporate continued project work 
into their budgetary plans” and will thus take on the 
“community structures” put in place during the 
project, their capacity to do this is limited.102 
This government-oriented approach explains why 
so many committees and community management 
structures have been either set up or revived during 
the project. There were those government 
committees and community structures already meant 
to be active, but which had to be revived by the KCPP:
Sub-County
KCPP
District
£, 
£, 101
£, 100
Village health teams
Farmers’ groups 
Health management committees 
Parish development committees
School management committees
Parent teacher associations
Sub-county technical planning committee
Sub-county health committee
Parish sanitation committees
Sub-county sanitation committees
There were those committees and community 
structures set up by the KCPP, which were outside 
the government system but which worked with  
local or district officials:
Water source committees
Project management committees
Project steering committees
And there were those committees and community 
structures set up by KCPP, which were in some ways 
at a distance from the government:
Marketing associations
Information education communication working 
groups
Hygiene working groups
Community resource centre management 
committee
Katine joint farmers association 
Village savings and loans associations
The point is twofold: that the majority of these 
structures are meant to ensure that people in the 
community have a way of organising themselves to 
keep the work of the KCPP going once the funding 
ends, and that most of these structures are 
government-oriented. The water source committee, 
for example, offers people a forum to petition the 
district water office, should the borehole require 
serious engineering work. The village health team 
links to national policy.103 
In this, the KCPP reflects international “best 
practice”. In the past, NGOs have been criticised for 
setting up parallel structures that run alongside, and 
in some ways compete with, what the government is 
doing.104 The favoured approach at the moment is to 
build up things that the government is itself formally 
committed to taking on, once the project comes to an 
end. And in expecting high levels of community 
participation, the KCPP is also in line with 
community development approaches. The best 
chance of keeping things going comes from the 
goodwill and active participation of people. 
Community structures are meant to keep the 
boreholes working, homes hygienic and sanitary, and 
Katine review  
The KCPP: Sustainability and empowerment
17
agricultural innovations continuous. As the Guardian 
stated at the outset, the KCPP model depends to a 
degree on active participation: “Unless everyone is 
engaged and enthusiastic, the achievements of the 
three-year project will not last,”105 
Empowerment is meant to be the glue that makes 
people participate and makes these governance 
structures work. As Amref’s country director, Joshua 
Kyallo, stated: “Katine is about community 
empowerment”. He defines this as the “capacity of 
the community to plan and to gather information on 
Katine so that the district can submit better plans to 
central government”.106 In development circles, 
empowerment typically means giving people 
knowledge about their rights and a sense of 
entitlement to demand those rights.107 The emphasis 
is on people challenging the government, its officials 
and representatives and “giving people or 
communities the power to control their lives”.108 
What the material provided on the website makes 
clear is that the KCPP is, in many ways, indicative of 
the paradoxes and contradictions that inhabit the 
way NGOs use concepts such as sustainability or 
empowerment. People in Katine are poorly served by 
their government.109 There are not only problems of 
underfunding but also issues of corruption, 
understaffing and the many demands exerted by 
different NGOs doing different projects. The health 
centre in Tiriri illustrates the difficulties of working 
with an under-resourced public health sector.110 
Policies such as universal primary education, 
which are meant to give students at Amorikot a good 
education, work poorly in practice.111 Many children 
in Katine were taught under trees or not taught at all. 
Teachers continue not to turn up to work or are not 
employed because there is no money to pay them.112 
How do you ensure sustainability when local 
government structures are so weak? How do NGOs, 
which are relatively powerful themselves, actively 
empower poorer people? 
In his analysis of development work in Uganda,  
EA Brett, of the London School of Economics, also 
questions the limits on the amount of participation  
or community engagement an NGO can reasonably 
demand.113 On-the-ground structures require 
investments of time and effort; they do not come 
without cost. This explains why so many of the 
community structures and committees supported  
by the KCPP were inactive at the start of the project. 
What it means to actually keep people engaged and 
enthused explains, perhaps, why the KCPP has had  
to give financial and material incentives to people 
who join committees or who take on responsibilities 
in the community. Village health team members 
received bicycles and gumboots, and allowances for 
attending training.114 Uganda’s government does not 
give financial incentives for people to participate, 
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which mostly explains why so many committees  
in rural Uganda are moribund or underutilised once 
an NGO leaves. 
The belief that the government will work with 
members of the community once Amref and the 
other NGOs leave is, perhaps, the most troubling 
aspect of the KCPP. Working with government is the 
only substantive way in which sustainability is 
conceptualised. It suggests an overly optimistic 
assessment of the capabilities of the state in Uganda, 
and does not really address the wider issue of 
whether or not the district government can budget 
for all of the things introduced by the KCPP. 
In what ways, then, is the KCPP sustainable? The 
official line is that sustainability will come from 
working with the government. This would align the 
project with the current hope that the Ugandan 
government will do a better job of matching its 
policies with what it does in places like Katine. My 
best guess is that sustainability is more likely to come 
from the work of other NGOs. They will come to 
Katine and do similar sorts of things. This should help 
keep the boreholes working, and maintain the new 
school buildings. 
While the district government does a certain 
amount for some of the time, much of what exists in 
much of the developing world is the result of the 
work of NGOs, past and present. The KCPP in Katine 
revived, renovated and rebuilt past interventions, 
and also did some new things.115 Many of the water 
sources that were renovated were installed by other 
NGOs. In several instances, pieces of infrastructure 
that look like “the state” — a school building, health 
clinic, or borehole — are the convoluted legacy of 
earlier encounters with development. While NGOs 
often raise funds on the claim that they do something 
new and different, part of the truth is that each 
individual project connects to a much longer, and 
much more complicated, history. There may be a 
logic, over the longer term, to empower people to 
make government structures work for them. In the 
?????? ??? ???? ?????????????????????????????????
18
Conclusion
‘We chose it because it had  
the hardest problems’
Alan Rusbridger, the Guardian, 22 June 2010
‘Over the course of a year, just £8 a 
month could train and equip a 
community health worker, who will 
prevent and treat diseases and illness’
http://uk.amref.org/donate/
D
evelopment appears simple. 
When a fundraising newsletter 
comes through the door or  
an email arrives in your inbox,  
you are told how easy it is to 
bring about change. “Give £5  
a month and educate a child”; 
“Pledge £8 a month and train  
a community health worker”. The five-minute video 
during a Comic Relief telethon makes development 
look straightforward. A school is built, a poor family 
given a lifeline. The focus is on the end result. 
Katine shows that actually doing development  
is difficult. In Katine, the classrooms built at 
Amorikot are a lot better than what was there before, 
but the school also needs good teachers, which is  
the responsibility of the local education office.  
The village health teams have been good at raising 
awareness but are poorly supported by the Ministry 
of Health. Village savings and loans associations are  
a big success, and people have used the money saved 
to set up businesses and improve their lives. But you 
only really understand the value of their work if you 
know about how they help move beyond the violence 
of the recent past. You are shown that development  
is less than perfect. But you are also shown that there 
is positive change.
The village savings and loans associations, 
supported by Barclays and the NGO, Care 
International, have encouraged people to save money 
and start new businesses. By the middle of 2010, 
people had banked more than £22,482 in these 
associations. (To put this in some sort of perspective, 
the total amount saved was more than six times what 
people paid to the local government in tax.) In health, 
the number of people reporting for HIV testing has 
gone up from 1,278 to 4,357 in the space of a year. The 
percentage of under-fives immunised went from just 
over 40% in 2006 to close to 100% in 2009. By the 
end of the third year of the project, Amref had built 
16 new classrooms, provided more than 5,000 
textbooks and delivered 1,100 desks. In water, only 
42% of people had access to clean water at the start of 
the project. By September 2010, clean water coverage 
had rocketed to 69.9%. 
These numbers are important. At the same time, 
this review has focused on the relationship between 
the media and development. Katine has brought the 
complexity of development work to a global 
audience. Journalists report on failures as well as 
successes. The popularity of a new variety of cassava, 
the staple food crop, can be set alongside the failure 
of orange and lemon trees to cope with the drought in 
2009. Amref put its work on the Guardian website for 
people to see, unedited and unspun. You can trace 
the story of Amorikot school, look at the success of 
the village savings and loans associations, debate the 
approach to community health. Questions about 
sustainability have been raised, prompting people to 
blog in with their advice and criticism. The project 
has lasted three years, and Amref has one more year 
to go (it has secured funding for an extra year to 
consolidate its work). In this time, we have got to 
know a lot about Katine and what it has meant to 
implement the KCPP. 
Katine suggests a different way of reporting 
development. It shows that you can engage with one 
place, over a period of time, and show how 
development works. The sustained coverage of 
Katine has produced insights on development that 
are not gained when more traditional ways of 
reporting are adopted. Journalism usually focuses on 
crises in the developing world or picks up only one 
issue or theme. In Katine, you get to see how issues 
of politics, society, culture and economics are related 
to one another. You gain an insight into the complex 
lives of people there. But what is also seen is how 
these lives intersect with local, national and 
international systems. In this, you see what it means 
to bring about development and change in a poor, 
????????????????? ?
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U
ganda’s education system is 
uneven. Despite a national  
policy of “universal primary 
education” — in place since 1997 
— the quality and quantity of 
educational provision remains 
poor, with wealthier parents 
sending their children to private 
schools. In Soroti district, which includes Katine sub-
county, there are 60 primary school pupils for every 
teacher. There are 82 pupils for every classroom.117 
There are problems with attendance (both pupils and 
teachers), not enough teachers, quality of teaching, 
financial oversight and mismanagement. More than a 
decade after the inception of universal primary 
education, Katine sub-county needs the following 
investments to meet government standards:
The KCPP intervention in Katine has gone some way 
to addressing this shortfall. Of the 42 classrooms 
needed, the KCPP committed itself to building 16.119 
The KCPP exceeded the required number of books for 
all schools to meet the government standard (though 
the year 2 report notes than only 10 of the 15 schools 
received enough books).120 
It is too early to tell what this means in terms of 
educational performance. Enrolment, which was low 
in Katine when compared to the national average at 
the start of the project, increased at a faster rate 
locally than nationally. Whether this increase is 
matched by increasing levels of educational 
performance depends on a number of factors beyond 
the project’s control (most obviously the provision of 
trained, qualified teachers, who turn up to work). 
While the number of students passing the primary 
leavers examination is higher then the national 
average (88.9% versus 85.6% in 2009), this gives no 
indication of the number of children put forward for 
examination or the quality of passes.121 
Enrolment figures for 2009 show an increase in 
Katine of 12% compared to a national increase of 
4.18%.122 The district figures tell a slightly different 
story. Enrolment across Soroti district increased by 
13.72% in 2008 as compared to a figure of 5.88% in 
Katine in that year:123
Education 
‘Improved 
teaching and 
learning 
environment’ 116
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, desks118
 classroom 
buildings
 
textbooks
 more 
teachers
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Of the six parishes within Katine sub-county (Olwelai, 
Ojom, Ochuloi, Merok, Katine and Ojama), Ochuloi 
had the poorest enrolment rate at the start of the 
project, with 74% of boys and 61% of girls of primary 
school age on the register.124 Investments in Ochuloi 
have been less than in other parishes. Through the 
first three years of the project there has been training 
for teachers on: school materials; child-centred 
methods; hygiene (year 1); child-centred methods 
(year 2); lesson planning; and role-modelling for girls, 
orphans and vulnerable children (year 3).125 There has 
also been training for parent teacher associations and 
school management committees in all three years.126 
The work of the KCPP in education shows the gains 
that can be made through a development project. At 
the same time you also see the limitations imposed 
by the Ugandan government and its commitment to 
universal primary education. Much of the emphasis, 
from donors and outside observers, has been on 
meeting this commitment rather than addressing 
practical concerns in Katine. In this, the gap between 
rhetoric and reality is often jarring. Schools are 
under-resourced, poorly provisioned and the 
prospects for poorer people in Katine are 
unpromising. Katine schools were far below the 
government’s own standards in terms of classroom 
allocation and pupil-to-desk ratio when the KCPP 
started. While the project helped to put in place the 
necessary infrastructure, there remains the bigger 
question of the structural weakness of Uganda’s 
??????????????????
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Year Katine sub-county Soroti district Uganda
 Number Growth Number Growth Number Growt
 n/a n/a ,
  n/a ,
  .% ,
  .%
+.%-.%  ,
+.% +.% ,
+.% +.% ,
n/a +.% ,n/a
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In terms of material investments Amref has made  
the following interventions by parish and school in the 
first three years of the project
En
ro
le
m
en
t
Note: as books are difficult  
to quantify based on available 
data, they are detailed here  
as deliveries (i.e. “one” means 
a single delivery of books).  
The number of desks is to a 
factor of 30 (i.e. “one” means 
30 desks received). 
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F
or people living in Katine, the most 
popular aspect of the water and 
sanitation component has been the 
provision of clean water (Kavuma, 27 
January 2008). The headline figure is 
that clean water coverage has gone 
up from 42% at the start of the 
project to 69.6% in September 2010. 
By the end of the fourth year, it is projected that clean 
water coverage will stand at 85%.127 This compares to 
a national average of 63%.128 Water is, perhaps the 
most tangible and most visible intervention by the 
KCPP. For the fourth year of the project, Amref has 
identified five more sites for new boreholes. 129
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Water & 
Sanitation
‘Improved 
access to  
safe water, 
sanitation  
and hygiene’
Safe water coverage (%)
Boreholes and renovated water sources have had to 
cope with large numbers. A protected shallow well, 
renovated by the KCPP in 2008, was used by 1,400 
people (against the government recommendation of 
150).130 A 2009 report notes that a borehole meant for 
250 people was being used by more than 600.131 This 
means there is the longer-term question of how to 
maintain the boreholes and other water sources. 
Mechanical failures are common in the water sector 
and are often costly to fix. That said, the relatively 
high functionality rate in Soroti district (90% of water 
sources are operational) is encouraging.132 
Amref trained water source committees to 
establish codes of practice and to levy user fees for 
maintenance. Amref also trained three pump 
mechanics to cope with borehole repairs and set up a 
general fund at sub-county level for the purchase of 
spare parts by water users who may want to carry out 
repairs or routine maintenance of their water 
facilities.133
Interventions in the sanitation sector, though 
important, are less easy to quantify both in terms of 
coverage and impact. The overall goal of improved 
sanitation was clear, and there were a number of 
Sector assessments  
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methods through which this was achieved (and  
data on many of these methods depended on village 
health teams, of which more later).134 
In terms of interventions at the household  
level, six parish sanitation committees were formed.  
Some 240 sanitation kits were handed out over the 
first year of the project, with which villagers 
constructed 1,400 latrines.135 Homes with latrines and 
other sanitation facilities are termed “ideal 
homesteads”, and by 2010 there were 398 of these 
homesteads in Katine.136 Amref also trained 24 
masons in constructing the concrete standing 
platforms that cover these latrines, improving their 
effectiveness, hygiene and durability.137 Water storage 
jars were provided to 10 vulnerable households in a 
sub-county of 29,300.138 
The graph (below) shows the increase in the 
number of households with a pit latrine. 
Unfortunately, Amref does not reference this  
statistic as consistently as it does safe water coverage. 
The graph shows that Katine was in a very poor 
position relative to the rest of Soroti district,  
and also shows significant improvements over the 
course of the project.
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Amref’s investments in sanitation were also 
channelled through the school system. 
Schoolteachers were put on “refresher courses” run 
by KCPP staff to promote awareness of hygiene and 
sanitation among schoolchildren.139 National 
sanitation week was also used as an opportunity to 
spread the message, with schools holding music, 
dance and drama events on the theme.140 The table 
(above) reproduces the totals required to bring the 
schools up to national standard, and looks at the 
actual facilities Amref delivered over the three years. 
The KCPP did a good job in terms of latrine 
coverage and rainwater harvesting in schools. At the 
start of 2010, Madeleine Bunting was able to report on 
the overall success of sanitation: “Another major 
success has been latrine coverage at household level. 
It’s not a glamorous issue, but it makes a huge 
difference to the disease burden in the family, 
particularly among children.”141?
Latrine coverage: Uganda, Soroti and Katine
 
Latrines stances Hand-washing  
facilities
Rainwater harvesting 
facilities in schools
   
Required  Delivered  Required  Delivered  Required  Delivered
*Figure calculated as mid-point between 2007 and 2009 
achievement as 2008 indicator is unavailable 
Sector assessments  
Water & Sanitation
23
of respondents said that they had  
received some form of health encounter 
from a village health team over the  
previous three months
of children had suffered with diarrhoea  
in previous two weeks
 
of women had delivered their children  
at a health facility 
of children had slept under a mosquito net
%
%
%
%
Amref’s baseline survey contains a number of figures 
demonstrating the failings of Uganda’s health system 
at the start of the project.142 
Health 
‘Improved 
community 
healthcare’
Health interventions focused on community-based 
approaches.143 Much of this was done through 
immunisation, mosquito net provision and ensuring 
access to clean water.144 
In human terms, the focus was on supporting 
village health teams,145 government-supported 
groups of people who provide advice on health 
issues.146 The KCPP, which laid on training, provided 
272 village health team members with training on 
basic treatments for common diseases, on 
prevention strategies and on health record-keeping. 
A smaller number of team members received further 
training to administer the vaccinations that Amref 
looked to roll out across Katine.147 In budgetary 
terms, the amount spent on training in the health 
component was £179,373 compared to £32,751 on 
supplies and equipment.
Over the course of the project, Amref distributed 
7,103 mosquito nets.148 There was a reported drop 
 in malaria in the under-fives, from 75.5% in 2008  
to 72.9% in 2009. In the same period, there was a 
reported drop in the number of over-fives suffering 
from malaria, with figures dropping from 57.7% to 
54.9%.149
In terms of immunisation, Amref trained up 
community immunisers to take the immunisation 
programme away from health centres and into 
communities.150 This produced a year-on-year 
increase in the number of under-fives being 
immunised.151 The achievement is summarised in a 
graph (next page), where a comparison is made with 
the national figures over the same period. Village 
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health teams are also largely responsible for the 
increase in HIV-testing in Katine. In the first year of 
the project 1,278 people reported for testing, while in 
the second year 4,357 reported for testing, almost a 
fourfold increase.152
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Percentage under fives vaccinated
The success of village health teams in Katine runs 
counter to the national story. At the start of 2010, the 
state-backed New Vision newspaper published a 
series of articles on the failure of village health 
teams.153 NGOs filled the void in different places. It 
was only because of Amref’s encouragement in 
Katine that the teams were active. And part of this 
encouragement came from providing gumboots and 
bicycles to village health team members.154 There 
were also allowances and per diems given to team 
members when they attended training. When Amref 
stopped paying these allowances, the village health 
teams stopped working.155 
This “strike” was called off by September 2010, 
and Amref worked through concerns with village 
health team members. This short-term resolution 
does not necessarily resolve the question of what will 
happen to village health teams once the project 
finishes in 2011. In theory, village health teams are an 
integral part of the national policy and the health 
sector management system of Uganda’s ministry of 
health. In practice, their level of activity varies 
greatly and is often dependent on the work of NGOs. 
??
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S
ome 83% of Katine’s households say 
growing and selling agricultural 
products is their number one source 
of income.156 The livelihoods 
component, focusing on new crop 
strains, cash crops and village 
savings and loans associations 
(VSLAs), is critical to the success of 
the KCPP. The NGO, Farm-Africa, was responsible for 
the initial design of the agricultural strand of the 
livelihoods component. Care International 
implemented the VLSAs with local NGO Uweso.157 The 
livelihoods component became increasingly central 
to the work of the KCPP, receiving a larger share of 
the budget year-on-year (see pink segments below): 
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B
roken boreholes, understaffed 
medical centres, schools without 
teachers, and the failure of 
disadvantaged groups (eg 
women, people living with Aids 
and people with disabilities) to 
make decisions and participate in 
local governance discussions are 
explained by the KCPP in terms of a community 
disempowered in its dealings with government. The 
governance (empowerment) programme of the Katine 
project is meant to bring change. And Amref, 
conscious that it initially only had three years in 
Katine, has been anxious to avoid setting up systems 
which make people dependent on the project. This 
has meant working with structures that are part of 
the government system, such as village health teams 
and parish development committees. However, there 
is often a considerable gap between what government 
structures exist on paper and what actually operate 
on the ground.
As I have already suggested in the section on 
empowerment and sustainability, it is usual to  
argue that communities need to be empowered  
to challenge the local, district and national 
governments. The empowerment agenda is part  
of the mainstream of development thinking at the 
moment. More empowered communities, so the 
theory goes, should be better at planning and 
co-ordinating development activities and will also  
do a better job of petitioning those in power for better 
services. This is an argument made famous by the 
Ugandan scholar, Professor Mahmood Mamdani, who 
argues that Africans should become full citizens, and 
in so doing shake off a colonial legacy that has made 
them passive subjects. There are historical, political 
and even psychological reasons for supporting an 
empowerment agenda. At the same time, power  
is also about competition over resources, and the 
Ugandan state does not have the money to do  
in practice what it is committed to on paper. 
This section is less concerned with the capacity  
of communities to engage with local governance, 
which is difficult to measure, than with the ability  
of the local government system to respond to 
people’s demands. If people in Katine are to have a 
better relationship with the government, there must 
be a correspondence between expectations and 
resources. The first point is that there is not enough 
money at the disposal of the district and local 
governments to sustain the demands of empowered 
communities. The KCPP budgets are more in Katine 
than the budgets of the district and sub-county 
government combined.165
Governance 
‘Communities 
empowered 
engage in local 
governance’ 
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Livelihoods has had a number of successes. In 2009, 
the new disease-resistant strain of cassava helped 
people through a period of famine,158 with 540 
households benefiting. Village savings and loans 
associations were also very popular. By the middle of 
2010, there were 150 associations banking a total of 
£22,482.159
 The associations require a membership fee of only 
200 Ugandan shillings (8p) and ask members to save 
regular sums, providing a common pool from which 
they can borrow.160 Training covers financial planning, 
reporting, conflict management, needs assessment 
and leadership. Over time, these associations 
generate enough money to take out loans for 
entrepreneurial activities, though in many cases 
people use the funds as a safety net, a way of coping 
with problems.161 It was a popular model that was 
easily replicated. Barclays decided to “go global” with 
village savings and loans associations in 2008, with 
the aim of improving access to basic banking services 
for 500,000 people in poorer parts of the world over a 
three-year period.162
There were some issues in the livelihoods 
component in terms of the scaling up of the 
agricultural element. Farm-Africa, the NGO 
responsible for the initial design, typically prefers a 
model of working with a small number of groups in 
an intensive way. This way, they can really see if new 
innovations and technologies work. If they work well, 
others copy. This is a qualitative approach, which 
relies on training more than giving people things and 
benefits fewer people directly. In the first years of the 
project, there were only 18 groups.163 But as the KCPP 
moved into its second and third years, the number of 
farmers groups increased to the point where, by the 
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groups. 164
The shift, in terms of numbers of groups and  
types of support, was explained by Farm-Africa staff 
as a response to pressure from below (from people  
in Katine who felt they were not benefiting directly 
from their work) and from above (funders who 
wanted wider coverage and who were critical of 
training). This may explain why the project was  
less successful in the more innovative agricultural 
components, such as the introduction of orange 
trees. It also explains why some new techniques did 
??????????? ??????? ?????????????????
Amref project activity budget 2009-2010
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Note that the above numbers do not include staff 
salaries, so they are a reflection of the money 
available for development activities. The project 
budget for 2008-2009 was nearly 28 times the 
development budget available to the sub-county.  
In 2008 and 2009, the KCPP was able to build as  
many new classrooms in one sub-county as Soroti 
district government managed to construct across  
the entire district. Or, to put it another way, the  
KCPP built 16 classrooms for 28,602 people, whereas 
the district government built 16 classrooms for 
369,789.168 The amount budgeted per classroom in  
the KCPP was also higher than that allocated by  
the government per classroom. 
A different but related point concerns the source of 
district funding. If empowerment is to work, then it 
helps to have a real stake in the money spent. In 
Soroti district and Katine sub-county, the size of local 
tax revenues is dwarfed by the contributions made by 
donors either directly or in the form of government 
grants (where much of the money comes from donors 
such as the World Bank or the UK’s Department for 
International Development). In theory, this is meant 
to change over the long term. In the meantime, the 
situation has serious implications in terms of the 
feasibility of any empowerment strategy, people in 
Katine have very little financial investment in their 
elected representatives, who draw most of their 
salary from money that comes from elsewhere.169 The 
following pie chart shows all tax revenues collected 
by the district government in Soroti, and compares 
this with the contributions made to the district 
government budget — either directly by donors, in 
the form of grants — or through subventions from the 
??????????????????????? ????????
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